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Abstract
Background: European Union (EU) legislation bans the sale of snus, a smokeless tobacco (SLT) which is considerably less
harmful than smoking, in all EU countries other than Sweden. To inform the current review of this legislation, this paper
aims to explore transnational tobacco company (TTC) interests in SLT and pure nicotine in Europe from the 1970s to the
present, comparing them with TTCs’ public claims of support for harm reduction.
Methods and Results: Internal tobacco industry documents (in total 416 documents dating from 1971 to 2009), obtained
via searching the online Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, were analysed using a hermeneutic approach. This library
comprises documents obtained via litigation in the US and does not include documents from Imperial Tobacco, Japan
Tobacco International, or Swedish Match. To help overcome this limitation and provide more recent data, we triangulated
our documentary findings with contemporary documentation including TTC investor presentations. The analysis
demonstrates that British American Tobacco explored SLT opportunities in Europe from 1971 driven by regulatory threats
and health concerns, both likely to impact cigarette sales negatively, and the potential to create a new form of tobacco use
among those no longer interested in taking up smoking. Young people were a key target. TTCs did not, however, make SLT
investments until 2002, a time when EU cigarette volumes started declining, smoke-free legislation was being introduced,
and public health became interested in harm reduction. All TTCs have now invested in snus (and recently in pure nicotine),
yet both early and recent snus test markets appear to have failed, and little evidence was found in TTCs’ corporate materials
that snus is central to their business strategy.
Conclusions: There is clear evidence that BAT’s early interest in introducing SLT in Europe was based on the potential for
creating an alternative form of tobacco use in light of declining cigarette sales and social restrictions on smoking, with
young people a key target. We conclude that by investing in snus, and recently nicotine, TTCs have eliminated competition
between cigarettes and lower-risk products, thus helping maintain the current market balance in favour of (highly
profitable) cigarettes while ensuring TTCs’ long-term future should cigarette sales decline further and profit margins be
eroded.
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Introduction
The European cigarette market, the second largest in the world
by volume [1] and highly profitable to the transnational tobacco
companies (TTCs) [2,3], is shrinking [4]. Although the tobacco
industry has hitherto successfully raised cigarette prices to offset
volume declines, thereby maintaining or increasing profits [5],
financial analysts have questioned the sustainability of this pricing
strategy in the medium to long term [6]. It has also been suggested
that the days of the traditional cigarette are numbered and that
TTCs are preparing for a ‘‘post-cigarette era’’ [7]. These trends
would appear to make alternative products an increasingly
attractive option for TTCs who have been investing in European
manufacturers of snus (a smokeless tobacco [SLT] product), and
more recently in pure nicotine products [8]. Furthermore, British
American Tobacco (BAT), Imperial Tobacco, Japan Tobacco
International (JTI), and Phillip Morris International (PMI) have all
recently become members, and sit on the Board of Directors, of
the European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC), a pan-
European SLT lobby group established in 1989 [9,10].
Despite these TTC investments, and unlike many other parts of
the world, SLT use is not well established in European Union (EU)
markets and an estimated 92% of revenue in the global tobacco
market is still generated from cigarettes [11]. According to the
2011 European survey for Smoking [12], regular use of SLT is
significant only in Sweden at 11%, compared to 2% or less in
other EU Member States. This reflects the fact that sales of certain
forms of SLT, notably snus, have been prohibited in EU countries
other than Sweden since 1992 [13]. Regular snus use is also
significant in Norway, a European Economic Area (but not EU)
member state, where daily snus use increased from 6% to 8%
between 2008 and 2011, the increase most noticeable among 16-
to 24-year-olds [14].
Since 2008, TTCs have been lobbying member states and the
European Commission to remove the EU ban on snus sales [15–
17], arguing that public health gains can be achieved if
governments allow potentially reduced-risk products like snus on
the market. The ‘‘Swedish Experience’’ is frequently cited as
providing proof of concept that switching smokers from cigarettes
to snus could be an effective harm reduction approach (Box 1).
More recently BAT has argued that their investments in pure
nicotine are driven by their ambition to provide smokers with a
safer alternative to cigarettes [18,19]. While many in public health
support harm reduction [20], some suggest any such approach
should be limited to nicotine rather than SLT products, while
others raise concerns that reduced harm products may be
promoted by TTCs for dual use with combusted products, which
would ultimately be detrimental to public health [21].
Following significant controversy including the resignation of
the European Health Commissioner [22], the European Com-
mission recently, and belatedly, published proposals to revise the
2001 Tobacco Products Directive (TPD, 2001/37/EC) [23], the
existing European legislation, which amongst other things,
maintains the original 1992 ban on the sale of snus. Despite
lobbying by industry and some public health groups, the European
Commission proposes this ban on snus sales should be continued
[24].
To inform this controversial policy debate, this paper aims to
explore TTCs’ interests in SLT and pure nicotine in Europe from
the 1970s to the present. It examines TTC’s historical interests,
including efforts to enter European markets and influence national
and EU public health policy, and the scale and nature of recent
investments. The paper thus aims to compare the industry’s
privately documented interests (observed via internal documents
and investor presentations) with those harm reduction pursuits it
has publicly espoused, and to subsequently explore the implica-
tions for EU tobacco control policy.
Methods
This study is based on qualitative analysis of internal tobacco
industry documents, available on the online Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/) following
litigation in the United States (US) [25]. Documents were retrieved
from May 2010 to February 2011. Repeat searches in December
2012 identified no additional newer documents, likely due to the
static nature of the tobacco document archive.
Most searches focused on BAT because preliminary searches
had shown BAT to have been most active in Europe. We also
included specific searches of Philip Morris (PM) and US Tobacco
Company (UST) documents, the latter having collaborated with
BAT to introduce SLT in Europe in the 1980s. Documents were
initially identified and retrieved by SP via broad search terms
(e.g. smokeless tobacco, snuff, snus, ST, OTP, innovative
products, adjacency products), narrowed by using Boolean
operators to include geographically specific search terms (e.g.
Europe, EEC, EC, and EU). These initial searches were used to
identify further search terms, including relevant project names
(e.g. Penzance, Lotus, and Denver), internal committees (e.g.
BAT’s New Products Committee), and key personnel. Surround-
ing Bates numbers of key documents were also searched. The
iterative process of searching, analysing, and refining by SP,
overseen by AG, narrowed down over 15,000 documents to a
final set of approximately 416 documents dating from 1971 to
2009. We were as comprehensive as possible in our searching and
reached a point of document saturation, where new searches led
to documents that had already been retrieved: an indicator that
most important documents had already been identified. Analysis
of these documents was based on an hermeneutic approach to
company document analysis summarised by Forster [26], and
complemented by the socio-historical archival techniques recom-
mended by Hill [27] using an approach previously developed by
AG [28]. This involves understanding the meaning of individual
documents through reading and re-reading them over time and
Box 1. The ‘‘Swedish Experience’’ Debate
Swedish men have one of the lowest daily smoking rates in
Europe [122], and one of the lowest rates of tobacco
related disease (including lung cancer and cardiovascular
disease) globally [123]. Many in public health attribute the
high male snus consumption for the reductions in Swedish
male smoking, proposing that this proof of concept could
be replicated elsewhere in the EU and achieve net health
gains [20,124,125]. Others [112,126,127], many from
Scandinavia, have criticized this interpretation of Swedish
data, countering that strong Swedish tobacco control
measures instead played a significant role in reducing male
smoking prevalence, highlighting that Swedish data show
that only 5% of Swedish males smokers quit smoking
using snus, that four out of 10 male snus users started their
tobacco use with snus, and that almost as many continue
to smoke and are dual users. Furthermore, they argue that
smoking prevalence amongst Swedish women also signif-
icantly declined in the last 20 years (from 29% to 14%),
albeit with no significant uptake in snus, thus indicating
that snus is not associated with this decline.
Tobacco Industry’s Interests in Snus in Europe
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considering them alongside other documents, identifying themes
and sub-themes and then triangulating the documents with other
data. Where uncertainty over document meaning existed, these
documents were reviewed by a second researcher. Finally, the
documentary findings were placed in their broader context using
other data sources including newspaper reports from the time
[28].
A variety of data sources were used to triangulate the
documentary findings. We compiled data specifically on TTC
investments in snus and pure nicotine in the EU and
systematically examined TTCs investor presentations, searching
for the terms ‘‘harm reduction’’, ‘‘reduced harm’’, ‘‘smokeless’’,
and ‘‘snus’’, and recording all occurrences. We limited this part
of the analysis to those investor reports publicly available on
the websites of PMI (www.pmi.com) and BAT (www.bat.com)
in September 2012: 42 BAT presentations dating from 2007 to
2012 and 47 PMI presentations from 2008 to 2012. We also
accessed BAT sustainability reports from 2001/02 (the first year
of publication) to 2011 (prior to 2007 these were referred to as
social reports), to identify further detail on BAT’s snus
investments. Furthermore, the paper draws on media reports
on industry mergers, acquisitions and other developments
identified via Nexus UK searches undertaken between January
2011 and January 2013 (using the names of the TTCs
combined with terms ‘‘snus’’ and ‘‘smokeless’’ as search terms
and no date limit), relevant tobacco industry journal (Tobacco
Reporter and Tobacco Journal International) articles, Euromonitor
reports, and other industry materials (notably press releases and
websites).
Results
Internal Industry Documents
British American Tobacco in Western Europe. Despite
TTC investment in SLT being a fairly new development, internal
documents (with earliest BAT documents dating from 1971 and
PM documents from 1978) reveal that BAT and PM have been
investigating the concept for decades [29,30]. Whereas PM
primarily focused on scoping opportunities in the US, initially
via acquisition and later via developing its own SLT product [31],
during the 1970s and 1980s BAT actively explored opportunities
in virgin SLT markets including South Africa, Australia, and
Western Europe [32–34]. BAT’s interest in SLT, prompted by an
approach in 1971 from the American tobacco manufacturer UST
(now US Smokeless Tobacco Company, subsidiary of Altria) [29],
can be viewed in context of the TTCs’ then operating
environment. Revelations in the 1950s that smoking kills triggered
substantial tobacco industry diversification, starting in the 1960s
and continuing well into the 1980s [35,36]. BAT for example
invested in several businesses related to paper making, cosmetics,
and food [36].
BAT’s initial interest in diversifying into SLT in Western
Europe arose from an awareness that health concerns about
smoking would increase as would regulation, both threatening
cigarette sales, and that SLT provided opportunities where
smoking was prohibited [37–40]. This is illustrated in an internal
briefing (1981) on SLT opportunities:
We have no wish to aid or hasten any decline in cigarette smoking.
Deeper involvement in smokeless is strategically defensible. There are
fewer people in sophisticated markets starting to smoke. There are
increasing numbers of people giving up. There are increasing restrictions
on smoking, particularly in public, whether by law or by society [32].
Table 1 further summarises themes we identified in four internal
position papers examining BAT’s arguments for and against
investing in SLT and entering into a partnership with UST
[32,33,41,42]. Despite evidence that BAT scientists understood
SLT to be ‘‘probably’’ less hazardous than smoking tobacco as
early as 1971 [43], the potential health benefits of SLT over
smoked tobacco products does not feature in these position papers,
although SLT’s ability to ‘‘provide a line of aggressive defence to
the image and acceptability of tobacco and nicotine in general
(and perhaps smoking indirectly)’’ [33] does (Table 1).
BAT’s preliminary discussions with UST were abandoned in
1973 when BAT’s concept evaluation (codename ‘‘Penzance’’)
exploring European consumer acceptance of SLT [34] came
back with unsatisfactory results [44]. However, discussions
between the two companies resumed in the early 1980s
following BAT’s realisation that, despite smoking prevalence
and cigarette consumption falling in markets like the United
Kingdom (UK) [45], tobacco remained its most profitable
business (compared to its non-tobacco activities) [46]. Negotia-
tions gained momentum when UST developed Skoal Bandits in
1983, a SLT ‘‘starter product’’ [47]. Skoal Bandits was a legacy
of project ‘‘Lotus,’’ a former collaboration between UST and
state-owned Swedish Tobacco (now Swedish Match, the largest
European SLT manufacturer and market leader in Scandinavia)
which pioneered portioned moist snuff to make SLT easier for
people to consume, including people as young as 15 years of age
[48,49].
BAT estimated that Skoal Bandits would generate new profits in
Western Europe rather than ‘‘cannibalise existing profits from
cigarettes’’ [50], with Skoal Bandits anticipated to appeal to new
generations of better-educated people no longer interested in
taking up smoking. BAT’s objective was ‘‘to market the range to
younger, urban consumers as an alternative way to enjoy tobacco’’
[50]. A Dutch test market for Skoal Bandits was proposed; initially
Amsterdam was considered because it had ‘‘a large youth and
student population’’, but Utrecht, ‘‘which also has a university’’,
was identified as potentially a better test market [50].
BAT eventually agreed to a German test market [51], but
withdrew a year later due to reported high levels of nitrosamines in
Skoal Bandits [52]. Documents suggest BAT was as much
concerned about the risk of controversy and damage to its
reputation as about the actual health risks from nitrosamines. An
internal BAT briefing in April 1985 reported that:
BATCF’s R&D people are checking the product and all reputable
sources of published research. It will then be a judgement call on the risk
of forming a joint company with USTCo, and marketing Skoal
Bandits. If the BARCLAYS controversy did not exist, the willingness to
accept the risk would be higher [53].
The ‘‘Barclays controversy’’ refers to BAT’s public relations
disaster in the early 1980s when the company had marketed its
new Barclay cigarette as ultra-low tar, whereas in reality the
cigarette design had deceived official tar-measuring machines and
delivered a much higher tar yield than measured [54]. Conse-
quently, BAT’s competitors had taken BAT to court in several
countries, including Germany where BAT settled out of court
because ‘‘[the public dispute] had assumed proportions which
would have ruined all further chances on the German market for
the initially very successfully launched brand’’ [55]. Thus the
concern about high levels of nitrosamine in Skoal Bandits, and the
controversy it could have caused, effectively ended two decades of
BAT scoping SLT opportunities in Europe.
Tobacco Industry’s Interests in Snus in Europe
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Entry of Skoal Bandits to the European market. Despite
BAT’s withdrawal, UST aggressively marketed SLT in the mid-
1980s as ‘‘the new way to enjoy tobacco’’ [56] in several European
markets, including the UK [57,58]. Despite a voluntary agreement
to curb tobacco industry marketing and the UK government
insisting that ‘‘the tobacco industry could be relied upon to act
responsibly’’ [59], an internal BAT memo reported that UST was
‘‘working the Universities’’, including paying students to promote
Skoal Bandits to peers [60]. UST’s marketing tactics in the UK
mirrored those used in the US where it had been heavily criticised
for aggressively targeting young people through its College
Marketing Program [61–64].
In an attempt to secure government support and thwart
regulation in the UK, UST commissioned scientific research
that claimed there was no causal link between Skoal Bandits and
cancer [65–67] and sought out professional parliamentary
lobbying services [68]. In what became known as the ‘‘Cash
for Questions’’ scandal, it was revealed that two UK Members
of Parliament had actively promoted UST’s interests to Health
Ministers and the UK Parliament from 1985 to 1989 while
enjoying hospitality from UST (Box 2). Despite UST’s extensive
lobbying efforts, in 1989 the UK Government introduced the
Oral Snuff (Safety) Regulations banning the sales of certain oral
tobacco including Skoal Bandits [69]. This had been prompted
by a public outcry and well-organised public health campaign
against Skoal Bandits [70]. Two years later, however, a
successful appeal by UST in the British High Court [69]
nullified the ban [71].
TTC response to 1992 ban on oral tobacco. Meanwhile,
European opposition to Skoal Bandits, and tobacco in general, was
growing. Fear of Skoal Bandits being aggressively targeted to
young people throughout Europe prompted the European
Parliament to propose an EU-wide ban on ‘‘oral tobacco’’ sales
in September 1987 [72,73]. This was in line with the World
Health Organization’s (WHO) recommendation, published sever-
al months earlier, urging countries with no history of SLT use to
pre-emptively ban SLT, thus preventing it from becoming a future
public health problem [72]. Despite UST’s successful challenge in
the British High Court which built on its successful annulment of
Table 1. Themes of BAT’s rationales for and against investing in SLT, and partnering with UST, based on 1980s BAT documents.
Pros Cons
Investment in SLT Fewer people starting smoking, more people quitting smoking
No passive smoking with SLT, thus more socially acceptable
Restrictions on smoking in public
SLT can defend the image of the industry and its core product,
nicotine
SLT profit margins will be high (low tax and low production costs)
Growth of SLT market in US, in particular moist snuff segment
Competitors will capitalise on SLT opportunities if BAT doesn’t act
There’s a stigma to using SLT
SLT is an acquired taste, thus initial sales in new markets
will be labour- and cost-intensive
Success of SLT products in US due to freedom in
advertising and promotion
Some adverse health publicity in US and more attention
likely if cigarette companies enter the business
SLT doesn’t offer/substitute some of the socio-
psychological pleasures of cigarettes
UST partnership UST is the market leader in US, is very profitable, and enjoys a good
reputation within the tobacco industry
UST is pioneer in active marketing of SLT
Limited costs for BAT; factories, existing products, brands, and
trademarks in place
No alternative; UST is only company that approached BAT
Rumour that competitors are interested in UST
UST has limited product development and research
facilities
Questionable product manufacturing quality and
development facilities (which ‘‘in line with all US
companies’’, BAT found ‘‘lacking’’ [32])
Only two UST trademarks experiencing growth in the US,
and one in Canada
Based on four separate BAT marketing briefings in the 1980s [32,33,41,42].
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001506.t001
Box 2. The ‘‘Cash for Questions’’ Affair
The Cash for Questions Affair was a political scandal in the
1990s in the UK. The scandal came to light when The
Guardian newspaper published an article in October 1994
claiming that professional parliamentary lobby firm Ian
Greer Associates had bribed two Conservative Members of
Parliament (MPs), Neil Hamilton and Tim Smith, to put forth
parliamentary questions (at £2,000 a question) on behalf of
then Harrods owner Mohamed Al-Fayed [128]. A subse-
quent public inquiry by the House of Commons Select
Committee on Standards & Privileges in 1997 found that
Hamilton, and another MP Michael Brown, had also been
providing parliamentary services to UST from 1985 to 1989.
According to evidence in the Committee’s report [68], the
parliamentary support for UST had included the two MPs
asking questions in Parliament and put forth Early DayMotions
[129,130]. The MPs had also lobbied government ministers on
behalf of UST. For instance, following the UK Government’s
announcement in February 1988 that it intended to ban oral
tobacco [131], Brown and Hamilton met several times with
Health Ministers Clarke, Currie, and Mellor to oppose the
legislation [132–134]. Kenneth Clarke, who later became
Deputy Chairman and Director for BAT, recalled in a written
statement to the Committee that he certainly remembered
‘‘being lobbied vigorously by Neil Hamilton, who was very
indignant about the prohibition’’ [134].
Furthermore, evidence from the Committee’s report found
that both MPs had been paid £6,000 each by Ian Greer
Associates for introducing the lobby firm to UST [129,135].
Neither MP had added the payment to the Register of
Members’ Interests, nor declared it for tax purposes [136]. In
addition, both MPs enjoyed hospitality from UST, including
trips to the US which were not declared on the Register of
Members’ Interests [129,130,135]. During the inquiry, Brown
and Hamilton both refuted claims that they were consultants
of UST, claiming instead that their support for Skoal Bandits
and its manufacturer came from their libertarian views that
people should have the right to make decisions for
themselves without interference from the State [129,130].
Tobacco Industry’s Interests in Snus in Europe
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similar legislation in Ireland [74], the EU-wide ban was enacted in
1992 under the amended Labelling Directive (Table 2).
Between 1987 (when the SLT ban was proposed) and 1992
(when it was enacted), we found very few internal industry
documents indicating industry opposition to the SLT ban.
Compared to the TTCs’ very active opposition to subsequent
EU tobacco control Directives [75–77] and its recent lobbying to
remove the ban [78–81], this suggests the TTCs did not actively
oppose the 1992 snus sales ban. The absence of activity is also
consistent with evidence that the industry’s EU lobby was
underdeveloped in the 1980s and early 1990s [75]. Furthermore,
the TTCs then dominating the European tobacco market had no
commercial interests in SLT in Europe. (At the time, Sweden was
not part of the EU, and the interests of Swedish Match’s
predecessor, Swedish Tobacco, were predominantly confined to
Sweden).
Nevertheless, the proposed ban prompted the establishment of
ESTOC in 1989, co-founded by UST and Swedish Tobacco, ‘‘to
promote understanding of the industry and its products and
dialogue with retailers, the media, regulatory and/or advisory
bodies’’ [82,83]. Although we searched UST documents, no
evidence was found to indicate that ESTOC and its members
directly lobbied against the proposed Directive. Documents do,
however, suggest that the Confederation of European Community
Cigarette Manufacturers (CECCM) briefly lobbied members of
the European Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs to
scrutinise the legality of the Directive, arguing that Article 100A
was an invalid legal basis [84]. It is doubtful that CECCM was
specifically threatened by the draft Labelling Directive, nor the
ban on SLT. Instead it is more plausible that CECCM wished to
challenge the legal basis of EU tobacco control legislation in
general, a tactic that has been central to industry efforts to derail
all key tobacco control efforts in Europe [75,76,85].
Contemporary Industry Interests in SLT, Other Reduced
Risk Products, and Harm Reduction
TTC investments in SLT and pure nicotine
products. Despite decades of scoping opportunities in SLT,
no actual European investment took place until 2002, when
Gallaher (now part of JTI) acquired snus manufacturer Gustavus.
A flurry of other SLT investments followed, culminating in the
PMI/Swedish Match joint venture in Feburary 2009 to sell snus
outside Sweden and the US (Figure 1). While BAT claims its
investment in snus occurred in response to consultation with
public health experts [86], the timing of these investments in
Europe also coincides with other notable developments. First,
cigarette volumes in Western Europe declined from 2002 [4].
Second, discussions at EU level on smoke-free environments led to
the 2003 EU Council recommendation (2003/54/EC) calling for
Member States to provide protection from second-hand smoke in
indoor workplaces, enclosed public places, and public transport
[137]. Ireland and Norway became the first European countries to
introduce smoke-free legislation in 2004, with all 27 EU Member
States now having some form of smoke-free legislation in place
[87]. The introduction of smoke-free legislation is reported to have
significantly increased snus consumption in Sweden and Norway
[88,89], the former experiencing a 17% increase in snus sales
volume in 2006, the year after Swedish smoke-free legislation was
introduced [88]. Finally, TTC SLT investments also follow
immediately from the first officially expressed high-level public
health interest in tobacco harm reduction [90].
From December 2009 the focus of investment in reduced risk
products switched from snus to pure nicotine products (Figure 1).
Reynolds American’s (of which BAT is the largest shareholder)
acquired Swedish pharmaceutical company Niconovum in
December 2009. In April 2011 BAT announced the establishment
of Nicoventures to ‘‘commercialise non-tobacco nicotine prod-
ucts’’ [91] apparently investing £100 million [92], and in May
PMI purchased a patent for a nicotine-containing aerosol [93]. In
2011 Imperial Tobacco reportedly purchased an ‘‘undisclosed
stake’’ in an e-cigarette company [19] while in the US Lorillard
announced in April 2012 that it had acquired e-cigarette company
Blu Ecig [94], and Altria reported shortly thereafter that one of its
subsidiaries was test marketing nicotine lozenges [95]. The most
recent development is BAT’s announcement that it has purchased
e-cigarette company CN Creative [96].
Snus market shares in Europe. As a result of TTC
investments in Swedish snus, all major snus companies have now
either been acquired by, or entered into a joint venture with,
TTCs [8]. Consequently, while Swedish Match retains the largest
market share of the European (i.e., Scandinavian) snus market
(Table 3), following the TTCs’ investments this has declined by
more than 10% in both Norway and Sweden over the last decade
[97,98]. Small, independent snus manufacturers account for only
an insignificant proportion of the market (Table 3). Genuine
competition between snus and cigarettes on the Scandinavian
markets is thus slowly being reduced.
Contemporary TTC reporting on snus, pure nicotine and
harm reduction. Only a few PMI and BAT investor presen-
tations (2 out of 42 BAT presentations over the period 2007 to
Table 2. EU Tobacco Control Directives specifically addressing SLT.
Directive Name/Year Directive Number Requirements
Labelling Directive (1992) 92/41/EEC SLT to carry ‘‘causes cancer’’ health warning
Definition of oral tobacco: ‘‘all products for oral use, except those intended to be smoked or chewed,
made whole or partly of tobacco, in powder or particulate form or in any combination of these
forms—particularly those presented in sachet portions or porous sachets—or in a form resembling a
food product’’
Ban on placing on the market of tobacco for oral use as defined above
Tobacco Products
Directive (2001)
2001/37/EC SLT health warning changed to: ‘‘This tobacco product can damage your health and is addictive’’
SLT health warning required to be on most visible surface of pack and cover at least 30% of pack
Ban on snus sales maintained, but derogation for Sweden based on Article 151 of the Act of
Accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden
Adapted from http://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/policy/.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001506.t002
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2012 and 4 out of 47 PMI presentations 2008–2012) directly refer
to their snus business, with PMI referring to snus as holding a
‘‘long-term promise in many markets’’ (emphasis added) [99]. The
near absence of snus from BAT and PMI investor presentations
suggests it is not a core part of their business strategy, a finding
which could be explained by emerging evidence of limited value
and volume growth opportunities in markets where SLT use is not
already established. Although snus is cheap to produce, it is
unclear what its profit margins are, certainly compared with the
extraordinary profits for cigarettes [5,100]. In a 2010 webcast to
investors, PMI’s then Chief Financial Officer, Hermann Walde-
mer, alluded to this when asked about PMI’s joint venture with
Swedish Match:
It’s something that will do us very good in the long term. This is why we
went into this joint venture. However, short-term it doesn’t have the
same urgency and importance than it already has when it comes to the
US market. The big profitability pools in the international tobacco
world, often are, and continue to be, in the cigarette category. But you
always need to be one step ahead, which is why we went into this joint
venture [101].
The volume growth potential for snus outside established SLT
markets is arguably limited. Not only does growth in the EU
require the snus sales ban to be lifted, but further afield snus test
markets appear to have failed. In April 2011 BAT announced that
it had ‘‘scaled back’’ snus test markets in Canada and South
Africa, and was no longer selling snus outside Scandinavia [102],
partly because ‘‘smokers often did not like using it in preference to
cigarettes’’ and partly because BAT wasn’t given regulatory
support to market the product as reduced risk [103]. Furthermore,
PMI recently remarked that, in regards to their snus test markets
with Swedish Match, ‘‘As expected, initial consumer adoption is
slow’’ [104].
Only very recently, following their investments in pure nicotine
in 2011, have three investor presentations (one BAT [105] and two
PMI [104,106]) included details on harm reduction efforts, but
then largely in the context of reduced risk products other than
snus. Although both BAT’s and PMI’s presentations briefly
acknowledged SLT and/or snus as an existing reduced risk
product, BAT’s David O’Reilly (Head of Research & Develop-
ment) suggested that harm reduction and a ‘‘portfolio of
commercially successful lower risk products’’ would lead to
‘‘revenue growth potential’’, and, crucially, have ‘‘new ‘would be
smokers’ begin with and stay with low risk product categories’’
[105]. PMI’s most recent presentation, on the other hand, focussed
on PMI’s ‘‘Next Generation Products’’ (both tobacco and pure
nicotine), of which it claimed that the first of three types will be on
the market by 2017 [104].
Discussion
Key Findings
A number of important findings emerge from this paper. The
documentary findings indicate that, historically, BAT’s interest in
SLT was driven purely by business concerns—the threat of
regulation, particularly smoke-free regulation, and growing health
concerns, both likely to result in falling cigarette sales. In this
context SLT was seen as having the potential ‘‘to generate new
profits without cannibalising existing profits from cigarettes’’ [50]
by creating a new form of tobacco use among those that would no
longer take up smoking due to health concerns. Yet concern about
the health impacts of its products was not a rationale for
investment and, despite BAT’s scientists being aware, from at
least 1971, that SLT was ‘‘probably’’ safer than smoked tobacco,
BAT did not actually directly sell SLT until 2005. By contrast,
BAT identified public relations opportunities emerging from SLT
[33] and it was this reputational concern that ultimately prompted
BAT to end its on–off association with UST in 1985 after high
levels of nitrosamines were reported in Skoal Bandits. Overall,
therefore, the documents suggest that BAT had little intention of
promoting SLT use in a way that would encourage adult smokers
to switch to SLT permanently as a means of reducing the risks of
smoking, an approach now publicly espoused by the TTCs.
The documents also make it clear that young people were seen
as the key target for SLT. Portioned snus was pioneered to make it
easier for young people to use, and European test markets were
Figure 1. Timeline of TTC investment and activities in smokeless tobacco and nicotine markets. Source: media reports on industry
mergers and acquisitions (identified via Nexus UK) and tobacco company websites.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001506.g001
Table 3. Snus company market shares (volume) in Sweden and Norway by percentage, 2011.
Company Sweden Norway Key Brands
Swedish Match
Only listed European
SLT manufacturer (sold its cigarette
business in 1999)
85.7 69.6 General, Ettan, Kronan, Grovsnus,
Go¨teborgs Rape´, Catch, Nick & Johnny,
Lab series
British American Tobacco
Acquired Fiedler & Lundgren
9.2 3.4 Granit, Mocca, Lucky Strike
Imperial Tobacco
Acquired Skruf Snus
3.0 22.2 Knox, Skruf
Japan Tobacco International
Acquired Gustavus snus when it took over
Gallaher
2.0 0.0 Gustavus, LD, Camel
Others (small independent snus
companies)
0.1 4.8 Thunder, Odens, Offroad, Ja¨gerpris,
Jakobsson’s
Adapted from Euromonitor Passport GMID Sweden and Norway data [97,98].
Snus brands from small independent companies were identified through random searches on the internet.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001506.t003
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identified on the basis of having large youth and student
populations. Furthermore, when UST’s Skoal Bandits was
eventually launched in the UK, students were both the target
and the means of promotion [60].
A number of findings suggest that the TTCs’ current SLT
strategy is very similar to its historical approach. First, the timing
of the eventual TTC investments in snus is consistent with the
original interest in SLT being driven by the dual threats of
regulation and declining sales, alongside reputational opportuni-
ties. Having explored SLT throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the
TTCs did not invest until 2002, when a flurry of investment
activity followed. We show that these investments coincided with
growing regulatory threats to cigarette sales including smoke-free
legislation and with documented high level public health interest in
harm reduction [90], the latter highlighting potential reputational
benefits, and the former offering smokers temporary nicotine relief
when smoking is prohibited.
Second, and perhaps most important, is that collectively our
evidence suggests that TTC snus investments were defensive—by
buying up snus manufacturers, the TTCs have turned snus from a
threat (a product that may have competed with cigarettes) to a
major opportunity (one that enables them to claim a joint agenda
with public health and to ensure their long-term future should
cigarette sales ultimately decline further or their profit margins be
eroded). A number of factors support this argument. The TTCs
have now bought up, or are in joint venture with, all significant
snus manufacturers to the extent that the only manufacturers that
fully remain independent of cigarette interests are tiny companies.
Thus any genuine competition between snus and cigarettes has
been eliminated; TTCs have ensured snus cannot cannibalise their
highly profitable cigarette market and have increased their already
considerable pricing power [100]. Yet despite these investments,
we found little evidence that snus was a core part of BAT’s or
PMI’s business strategy: it does not consistently feature in their
investor reports, BAT has recently abandoned its snus test
markets, and PMI’s limited references to snus suggest it is of
interest only in the long term [104] and that meanwhile the big
profits continue to come from cigarettes [101]. Third, there is
some suggestion from recent data that non-smokers, rather than
smokers, would be the target of reduced risk products [105],
entirely consistent with BAT’s historical desire to create a new
form of tobacco use to help overcome falling cigarette sales and
reduced smoking uptake. This is also consistent with observations
that in Russia (a virgin SLT market and snus test market of the
PMI/Swedish Match joint venture), a snus marketing campaign
appears to target young adults and non-tobacco users [107].
Another key finding in relation to the TTC’s SLT interests is
that both BAT’s original and latest test markets appear to have
failed, suggesting that snus may not work as a consumer product in
virgin markets. Although there are few documents on BAT’s 1973
exploration of consumer acceptance of SLT in Europe, it is clear
the results were negative [44]. Similarly, BAT’s test markets in
Canada and South Africa appear to have failed and BAT is no
longer selling snus outside Sweden (despite its ongoing rhetoric on
harm reduction).
While we are less able to comment on the rationale for the
TTC’s very recent pure nicotine investments, it is likely that, like
snus investments, they were prompted, like the snus investments,
by recognition of both the potential reputational and political
benefits and further concerns about the sustainability of the
tobacco market. We note that industry analysts were questioning
the long-term sustainability of the cigarette market [6] shortly
before PMI and BAT’s nicotine investments. Furthermore, the
TTCs’ investments in nicotine, on top of those in SLT, will have
served to further reduce competition in the European nicotine
market (which we define as encompassing all nicotine products,
from cigarettes, the most harmful, to pure nicotine, the least
harmful). This will enhance the already considerable profitability
of cigarettes [100] and thus help ensure the long-term sustain-
ability of the TTCs whose profits currently rely almost exclusively
on cigarettes.
Strengths and Limitations
One of the strengths of this paper is that it combines historical
document research with analysis of contemporary industry
materials, triangulating the documentary findings and overcoming
the issue that most retrieved documents predate 2002. It is unique
in examining industry interests in SLT in Europe, complementing
findings from the US (an established SLT market) that SLT is
marketed to augment cigarette use and offset smoke-free
regulations [31,108–111].
The nature of tobacco industry document research means that
we made decisions about relevant search terms and document
inclusion. Inadvertently, this may have led to relevant documents
being omitted. Furthermore, our analysis is limited to documents
made public following litigation; these document collections may
not be fully representative of all documents within the corporations
subject to the litigation and do not cover companies (Imperial
Tobacco, JTI, or Swedish Match) not subject to the litigation,
limiting our ability to explore their historical interests in this area.
Consequently, and because the documents indicated that PM’s
historical interest in SLT was in the US, our early findings relate to
BAT and UST. It is possible therefore that the absence of
documents indicating sustained industry opposition to the 1992
ban on snus sales reflect a weakness in the document collections
rather than a genuine absence of industry activity. However, we
think this unlikely given that extensive searches were undertaken
of the UST documents on this issue and previous evidence
indicates that the EU tobacco lobby was underdeveloped in that
time [75].
Policy Implications
Our findings have a number of implications for public health
policy and highlight the complexity of the debates around snus.
First, they indicate that the industry’s rhetoric on harm reduction
has been inconsistent with historical and recent documents and
business actions. Instead, the findings suggest that the TTCs’
interest in reduced-risk products lies in maintaining the status quo
in favour of cigarettes for as long as possible while simultaneously
providing a longer-term source of profit should the cigarette model
prove unsustainable; the reputational benefits are an additional
asset. The fact that SLT investments in Europe coincided with the
implementation of smoke-free policies, combined with evidence of
the industry’s promotion of dual cigarette and snus use in the US
[31,108–111], adds weight to the concern that TTCs may hope to
exploit snus as a way to reduce the impact of regulations aimed at
reducing smoking rates.
Second, a number of findings suggest that the generalisability of
the ‘‘Swedish experience’’ to countries in which SLT is not
traditionally used may be limited: the failure of snus test markets;
the lack of competition between cigarettes and snus which is a new
phenomenon and remains greater outside Sweden; and evidence
that the industry’s historic interest in snus was both because it
could be used in smoke-free environments and could be promoted
to young, non-tobacco users to create a new form of tobacco use.
This last finding lends support to concerns that SLT may lead to,
rather than from, smoking [111–113]. Further evidence that the
Swedish experience may not be generalizable comes from a recent
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study concluding that even in a market with a history of SLT use
like the US, smokers did not consider snus an acceptable substitute
for smoking or a way to quit smoking [114].
While such evidence must be considered alongside the broader
body of evidence around snus and the fact it is significantly less
harmful than smoked tobacco [115–117], collectively these issues
suggest that legalising snus sales in Europe may have considerably
less benefit than envisaged and could have a number of harmful
consequences. Perhaps of greater concern, however, given that
harm reduction using nicotine products is already an established
element of tobacco control [118] and recent research suggests
scope for benefit via newer nicotine products [119], are the recent
industry investments in pure nicotine products. These raise two
concerns. First, one of competition: should such investments
continue, competition between cigarettes and clean nicotine
products would decrease, limiting the potential for harm reduction
to benefit public health and maintaining the status quo of
cigarettes. While a nicotine regulatory authority could ensure that
regulation was proportional to harm [20,120], it would be
powerless to address the issue of competition, so this situation
needs close observation. Second, they may enable TTCs, by
presenting themselves as purveyors of nicotine rather than tobacco
products, to undermine Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control [121] which aims to protect public health
policy from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco
industry. Finally, if TTCs are genuinely interested in seeing their
cigarette consumers switch to snus (or pure nicotine products),
rather than creating new snus/nicotine users and/or dual use
opportunities, we would expect to see detailed strategic plans and
cigarette sales reduction targets at least for the markets where they
intend to introduce these products. However, to this date we have
yet to see this.
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Every year, about 5 million people die from
cancer, heart disease, and other tobacco-related diseases. In
recent years, to reduce this growing loss of life, international
and national bodies have drawn up various tobacco control
conventions and directives. For example, the European
Union (EU) Directives on tobacco control call for member
states to ban tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsor-
ship and to adopt taxation policies aimed at reducing
tobacco consumption. The 2001 EU Tobacco Products
Directive also bans the sale of snus, a form of smokeless
tobacco (SLT), in all EU countries except Sweden. Snus, which
originated in Sweden in the early 19th century, is a moist
tobacco product that is placed under the upper lip. Although
snus is considerably less harmful than smoking, the sale of
snus was banned in the EU in 1992 because of fears that it
might cause cancer and was being marketed to young
people. When Sweden joined the EU in 1994, exemption
from the ban was made a condition of the membership
treaty.
Why Was This Study Done? Transnational tobacco
companies (TTCs) have been investing in European snus
manufacturers since 2002 and more recently in pure nicotine
products, and it has been suggested that, faced with
declining cigarette markets in Europe and elsewhere, TTCs
are preparing for a ‘‘post-cigarette era’’. Since 2008, TTCs
have been lobbying EU member states and the European
Commission to remove the ban on snus sales, arguing that
public health would be improved if governments allowed
potentially reduced-harm products like snus onto the
market. At the end of 2012, however, the European
Commission proposed that the ban on snus sales should
be continued. Here, to help inform this controversial policy
debate, the researchers explore the interest of TTCs in SLT
and pure nicotine in Europe from the 1970s to the present
by examining internal tobacco documents and compare
these interests with public claims of support for harm
reduction made by TTCs.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? By searching
the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (internal tobacco
industry documents released following US litigation cases),
the researchers identified 416 documents that detail the
historical interest of TTCs in SLT and pure nicotine and their
efforts to enter European markets, and to influence national
and EU public-health policy. The researchers analyzed these
documents using a ‘‘hermeneutic’’ approach—methodical
reading and re-reading of the documents to identify themes
and sub-themes. Finally, they used TTC investor presenta-
tions and other documents to confirm these themes and to
provide recent data on TTC investment in SLT. British
American Tobacco (BAT) explored the opportunities for
marketing SLT products in Europe from 1971 onwards. This
exploration was driven by regulatory threats and health
concerns, both of which were likely to impact tobacco sales,
and by the potential to create a new form of tobacco use
among people no longer interested in taking up smoking.
TTCs did not begin to invest in SLT, however, until 2002, a
time when EU cigarette sale volumes started to decline,
smoke-free legislation was being introduced, and tobacco
harm reduction first became a major public-health issue. All
the TTCs have now invested in snus even though snus test
markets appear to have failed and even though there is little
evidence in corporate materials that snus is central to the
business strategy of TTCs.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings suggest
that BAT’s early interest in SLT in Europe was driven by
business concerns and was based on the potential for
creating an alternative form of tobacco use among people—
particularly young people—who would no longer take up
smoking because of health concerns. They also suggest that
TTC investments in snus were defensive—by buying up snus
manufacturers and more recently nicotine producers, TTCs
have eliminated competition between cigarettes and lower-
risk products, thereby helping to maintain the current
market balance in favor of cigarettes while ensuring the
long-term future of TTCs should cigarette sales decline
further. Although these findings are limited by the possibility
that some relevant documents may have been omitted from
this analysis, they nevertheless raise the concern that, if TTC
investment in SLT continues, competition between ciga-
rettes and SLT will reduce the potential for harm reduction to
benefit public health. Legalization of snus sales in the
European Union may therefore have considerably less
benefit than envisaged.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pmed.1001506.
N The World Health Organization provides information about
the dangers of tobacco (in several languages) and about
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, an
international treaty for tobacco control; for information
about the tobacco industry’s influence on policy, see the
2009 World Health Organization report ‘‘Tobacco
interference with tobacco control’’
N Details of European Union legislation on the manufacture,
presentation, and sale of tobacco products is available (in
several languages)
N Wikipedia has pages on tobacco harm reduction and on
snus (note: Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia that
anyone can edit; available in several languages)
N The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library is a searchable
public database of tobacco company internal documents
detailing their advertising, manufacturing, marketing,
sales, and scientific activities
N The UK Centre for Tobacco Control Studies is a network of
UK universities that undertakes original research, policy
development, advocacy, and teaching and training in the
field of tobacco control
N SmokeFree, a website provided by the UK National Health
Service, offers advice on quitting smoking and includes
personal stories from people who have stopped smoking
N Smokefree.gov, from the US National Cancer Institute,
offers online tools and resources to help people quit
smoking
N TobaccoTactics.org, an online resource managed by the
University of Bath, provides up-to-date information on the
tobacco industry and their tactics to influence tobacco
regulation
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